Abstract Adaptationism has prompted many a debate in philosophy of biology but the focus is usually on empirical and explanatory issues rather than methodological adaptationism (MA). Likewise, the context of evolutionary biology has provided the grounding for most discussions of the heuristic role of adaptationism. This paper extends the debate by drawing on case studies from physiology and systems biology to discuss the productive and problematic aspects of adaptationism in functional as well as evolutionary studies at different levels of biological organization. Gould and Lewontin's Spandrels-paper famously criticized adaptationist methodology for implying a risk of generating 'blind spots' with respect to nonselective effects on evolution. Some have claimed that this bias can be accommodated through the testing of evolutionary hypotheses. Although this is an important aspect of overcoming the pitfalls of adaptationism, I argue that the issue of methodological biases is broader than the question of testability. I demonstrate the productivity of adaptationist heuristics but also discuss the deeper problematic aspects associated with the imperialistic tendencies of the strong account of MA.
Introduction
Debates on adaptationism have centered primarily on questions regarding the relative causal power of selective and non-selective factors and the explanatory status of alternatives to adaptationist explanations. This paper adds to the literature by focusing on how adaptationism works as a heuristic, so-called methodological adaptationism (MA) , and discusses the implications of this strategy in different research contexts. Critics of MA argue that it presents a biased perspective on evolution because it assumes that biological traits are optimally designed by natural selection. But MA is a heuristic, and not an empirical claim about the biological world. Therefore, the productivity is not strictly dependent on the soundness of the assumptions made. In fact, the bias is central for the productivity of MA because it constrains the problem space by focusing attention on a set of possible adaptive explanations. The question I address is therefore not whether it is correct to assume that biological traits are adaptations, but to what extent this is useful or counterproductive for biologists.
I first introduce the debate on adaptationism and argue for the continued relevance of discussing MA. In introducing MA, I draw on two case studies (Sect. 2) from physiology and systems biology. The cases will be used to contextualize philosophical distinctions in the debate on adaptationism, and to reflect on the implications of MA in functional and evolutionary analyses at different levels of biological organization. I argue that the implications of MA depend on the research context such as the kind of biological question under scrutiny, whether it is possible to test adaptive claims, and if so how this might be achieved. Furthermore, I contend that the discussion of MA remains relevant, especially when discussed in relation to different research practices and issues that go beyond testability.
Debating Adaptationism
Adaptationism is the study of the function and origin of biological traits in a framework where biological features are assumed to reflect the effects of natural selection. Methodological adaptationism refers to the use of such assumptions as a heuristic, often divided into two reasoning strategies called adaptive thinking and reverse engineering (Dennett 1995; Griffiths 1996) . The former infers possible adaptive characters or behaviors from observed challenges to life forms in specific environments. In reverse engineering the inference goes in the opposite direction; from a biological character to an adaptive problem that the character may help solve. To guide the identification of specific relations between problems and solutions, biologists draw on knowledge from similar adaptations in other biological systems but also on analogies to good engineering design. Because of the intuitive appeal and successful use of this strategy, some have argued that adaptationism is not optional, but an inherent and central part of biology (Dawkins 1976; Dennett 1995) . However, adaptationism has also been widely criticized.
The most famous critique of adaptationism is Gould and Lewontin's (1979) Spandrels-paper that in a provocative tone accuses the adaptationists of sharing with Voltaire's fictive Dr. Pangloss the tendency to tell just-so stories about how the world is optimally structured. In their view, adaptationists often confuse the demonstration of current utility of characters with evidence of their origin. Furthermore, Gould and Lewontin argue that adaptationism nurtures a reductionist picture of organisms as composed of independent traits; as entities alienated from the environment that become the passive receivers of modifications through natural selection. Gould and Lewontin encourage biologists to replace naïve adaptationism with a more nuanced view of organisms as integrated wholes, and to increase the awareness of the interdependency of traits and of alternatives to selection. They illustrate the problematic by drawing an analogy with spandrels-the rounded triangular-shaped spaces formed by the intersection of arches in a cathedral. Since spandrels serve decorative purposes, it is tempting to conclude that this purpose explains their origin. However, Gould and Lewontin point out that these are in fact a necessary by-product of the decision to build a cathedral with a dome in need of stabilizing structures.
1 Analogous to the shaping of buildings according to architectural constraints, biological forms are constrained by a variety of factors aside from functional utility that are often overlooked in the search for adaptive explanations.
Gould and Lewontin (1979) raise two related critical points regarding (1) the importance of non-selective factors in evolution, and (2) the dominance of a highly biased methodological framework. In recent years, there has been an extensive debate on the causal power of non-selective factors, the significance of alternative explanations and requirements for testing evolutionary hypotheses (e.g. Brandon and Rausher 1996; Felsenstein 1985; Forber 2009; Kimura 1985; Orzack and Sober 1994a , b, 1996 Sober 1996) . The empirical basis for adaptive or non-adaptive claims is often taken to be the main point of Gould and Lewontin's paper. In response to the criticism, Orzack and Sober (1994b) argue that it is possible to test the validity of adaptationism by using different well-defined hypotheses about the power of natural selection. In contrast, others prefer to view adaptationism as a heuristic (Resnik 1997) . But in either case, the main criticism surrounds the unreliable nature of empirical assumptions about natural selection that form the basis for tests or recommendations (Mayr 1983; Sober 1996; Resnik 1997 ). Richardson, however, views the Spandrels-paper as a challenge to adaptationist methodology, understood in a broader sense, and argues that the criticism goes beyond the question of the ubiquity of adaptations (Richardson 2007, p. 54) . This interpretation is supported by the fact that Gould and Lewontin (1979) explicitly state that they regard natural selection as the most important evolutionary mechanism. Following Richardson's reading I reexamine the relevance of their concerns regarding methodology through contemporary case studies.
Empirical and Methodological Adaptationism
Disagreements surrounding whether adaptationism should be understood as an empirical hypothesis or a heuristic can be resolved by distinguishing between different kinds of adaptationism that Godfrey-Smith (2001) labels as methodological adaptationism (MA) and 'empirical adaptationism' (EA).
2 EA relates to the relative causal power of natural selection and is thus an empirical claim about the world. In contrast, MA is a policy recommendation for biologists on how to best approach biological systems. The latter is thus a heuristic, a rule-based cognitive strategy that shapes the forms of questions and answers. Adaptive hypotheses, in contrast to heuristics, consider empirical claims about a specific trait, or about the power of natural selection in general (EA).
MA and EA are often related in practice. Most biologists pursuing the adaptationist heuristic (MA) are also convinced of the power of natural selection (EA) and vice versa. The Spandrels-paper can readily be said to question the naïve forms of both types. However, as Godfrey-Smith points out, these different kinds do not logically entail each other. Even if it were the case that many traits are nonadaptive, biologists could still argue that to look for features of adaptation and good design is the best starting point for generating empirically testable hypotheses. The opposite is also possible although less common. Following Richardson's (2007) reading of Gould and Lewontin's paper, their account may be seen as exemplifying a weak form of EA that accepts the importance of natural selection while taking issue with the blind reliance on MA as a general methodological framework.
3 These characteristics imply that an analysis of MA is not complete with only empirical knowledge on the relative causal role of natural selection, but also requires insights into how methodological adaptationism guides or misguides the formation of new biological explanations.
Problematic uses of MA are often seen in evolutionary psychology and sociobiology where adaptationist hypotheses can be constructed around any dataset (Gould 1996; Richardson 2007) . Accordingly, the heuristic value of MA in these fields has been contested by how easily adaptationist claims are accepted and the unwillingness to consider alternatives: ''If nature disagrees with the adaptationist about what should evolve, then she has to shout. If she agrees, she has only to whisper'' (Griffiths 1996, 517) . In contrast, many other subfields of evolutionary biology have developed strict criteria for testing historical hypotheses by drawing on phylogenetic data and functional comparisons. In this context it is sometimes argued that Gould and Lewontin's criticism would be like kicking-in open doors if written today (Pigliucci 2009; Sober 1993; see Nielsen 2009 for a different view). My aim in this paper is not to discuss state of the art uses of optimality modeling, but to reexamine the merits of MA in light of contemporary research in physiology and systems biology. I consider a better understanding of MA in these fields an important aim in its own right, but I also contend that discussing MA in these fields brings insights to the broader debate on adaptationism.
2 Distinctions between MA and EA were made earlier (Mayr 1983; Sober 1993 Sober , 1996 . Godfrey-Smith's (2001) account includes a third position called 'explanatory adaptationism' (ExA), whereas Lewens (2009) increases the number of types to seven. Since I shall mainly focus on MA in this paper, the distinction between MA and EA will suffice for this paper. ExA can arguably also be seen as a part of what I define as strong MA-an imperialistic account of MA that may also influence explanatory ideals in biology (Sects. 3, 4) . 3 They would, however, object to a strong form of EA that considers developmental constraints only as non-directional limitations to selection.
Methodological Adaptationism in Different Practices
The case studies in the following sections will be used to flesh out how MA can work as a productive and problematic constraint on biological reasoning, and to contextualize philosophical distinctions on adaptationism. The first case study shows how the use of MA in investigations of the function of the giant nose of the sperm whale can guide the formulation of different specific adaptive hypotheses. In Sect. 2.2, a second case from systems biology shows the use of MA for functional decomposition of regulatory networks into so-called network motifs. Although systems biology is sometimes defined as a study of current biological functions, conclusions about the origin of characters are common (Alon 2007a; Salvado et al. 2011) . But because systems biologists often provide insufficient evidence for adaptive explanations, the evolutionary aspect of systems biology has been criticized for being merely a 'downstream appendix' that draws on misleading engineering analogies with adaptationist leanings (Lynch 2007b; Knight and Pinney 2009) . This case will therefore also serve as basis for the discussion of the problematic aspects of MA (Sects. 3, 4).
Case 1: Why Do Sperm Whales Have Big Noses?
The largest nose in the world belongs to the sperm whale. It accounts for one-third of the length of a male sperm whale and is called the spermaceti organ because it contains approximately 5,000 L of spermaceti oil. 4 Assuming that organisms in general are well adapted, the hypertrophic dimension of the nose has made biologists search for an explanation of why it is so big. Biologists were also fascinated by other attributes of sperm whales, in particular their ability to deal with extreme environmental challenges associated with deep diving. In the late 1960s, asdic recordings showed that sperm whales frequently dive deeper than 1,000 m to prey on giant squid (Clarke 1970) . Foraging in this environment is particularly challenging because the whales need to surface every 20-40 min to breathe, and because they must catch their prey in complete darkness. Connected to these challenges, two central hypotheses on the function of the nose have been proposed; (1) that it is a heat exchanger for buoyancy control, and (2) that the nose is used for foraging via biosonar.
A Heat Exchanger for Buoyancy Control?
The first scientific hypothesis on the function of the spermaceti organ was formulated by the biologist Malcolm Clarke. During a research visit to Durban in 1969, Clarke took part in field work and laboratory investigations of the density of sperm whale tissues compared to sea water under different pressures. He found that sperm whales have neutral buoyancy at surface level but must counteract positive buoyancy as they descend to forage. Based on the assumption that evolution has shaped the morphology of sperm whales to accommodate such challenges, Clarke reasoned that: ''nothing about its shape suggests that it is hydrodynamically adapted for this purpose so that some control over buoyancy seems likely'' (Clarke 1970, p. 873) . This type of reasoning exemplifies adaptive thinking; reasoning from adaptive problems to possible solutions.
A parallel analysis, initially uncoupled to the other project, regarded the functional potential of the spermaceti organ (reverse engineering). Clarke analyzed the physical and chemical properties of the spermaceti oil and found that the freezing point of the oil is 28°C. Density analyses showed that when the oil is in liquid phase it is lighter than water and vice versa in solid phase. Clarke coupled these findings and suggested that changes in the oil's density could help sperm whales control buoyancy. He proposed that, on the one hand, cooling the spermaceti oil until it solidifies would help the whale descend, while heating the oil could help the whale ascend. Thereby one adaptation could in two ways give sperm whales a ''great selective advantage'' (Clarke 1970 , see also Clarke 1978 . Scanning calorimeters were used to establish a comparative energy budget for diving with and without regulation of the temperature of the oil. A basic assumption was that evolution has found the most 'economic solution', which seemed to involve a control of buoyancy through regulation of the temperature of the oil via excess heat from metabolism and influx of cold water. The proposal was published in Nature and soon became widely known but, as we shall see in the following section, the proposal has recently been challenged.
A Sound Generator?
Two years after the publication of Clarke's hypothesis an alternative explanation was put forward by Kenneth Norris and George Harvey (Norris and Harvey 1972) . They focused on the adaptive problem of foraging in darkness and suggested that the spermaceti organ is a sound generator used for echolocation. Sperm whales had been known to use clicks to communicate since the beginning of the last century (reviewed in Whitehead 2003) , and more recent recordings had demonstrated echolocation in other toothed whales. Due to the similar physiology of the sperm whales' and related species such as dolphins, it seemed plausible that the functions of the organs would also be similar.
5 It was further hypothesized that the dimension of the nose reflected the capacity to produce sound pressures so powerful that their prey would be debilitated (Norris and Møhl 1983) . The latter extension of the hypothesis was given the nickname ''the big bang theory''. The hypothesis on echolocation was supported by studies of sound conduction in post mortem studies and by recordings in the field using hydrophone arrays to measure sound emission. Dissections of the spermaceti organ suggested that the organ works like an acoustic lens, and improved hydrophone arrays resulted in recordings of powerful sound pressures as expected from this theory (Møhl 2001; Møhl et al. 2003) . But before this hypothesis could become accepted there needed to be evidence that such powerful sound pressures could be generated at great depths. According to Boyle's law, only 1 % of the air inhaled at the surface is available at 1,000 m, where sperm whales regularly forage, and critics therefore considered this hypothesis unlikely to hold.
Evaluating Competing Adaptive Hypotheses
The controversy about the plausible function of the spermaceti organ lasted several decades because it was difficult to gather empirical evidence. Recordings from hydrophone arrays were imprecise and lacked continuity because optimal recordings could only be made when the whales faced the hydrophones. But developments in tag depth recorder and hydrophone technologies meant that it eventually became possible to attach this equipment directly onto whales using suction cups, at which point information on sound and depth could be gathered simultaneously. The recordings showed that sperm whales are able to produce very powerful clicks, even at depths below 1,000 m, because they can re-circulate the air in the nose .
The now well-accepted mechanism for sound emission in the spermaceti organ is as follows (Fig. 1) ; air is forced through the monkey-lips in front of the nose creating a sound pulse that passes through the spermaceti oil and is reflected in an air-filled cushion at its far end. The section called the junk then redirects the sound into the water Møhl et al. 2003) .
Confirmation that the spermaceti organ emits sound, based on the simultaneous recordings of depth and clicks, provided an argument against Clarke's hypothesis. According to Clarke's hypothesis the velocity of sound, and thus the interval between pulses, should vary with temperature changes of the oil. But only a small difference in pulse interval was recorded, reflecting pressure differences at varying depths. Madsen therefore concludes that the temperature of the spermaceti oil must be constant during the dive (Madsen 2002) . The result of further testing thus identified the spermaceti organ as a wide-ranging sound generator. The ''big-bang theory'' of prey debilitation was, however, rejected because squids did not seem to be affected by high sound pressures (Wilson et al. 2008) . In summary, the assumption that the spermaceti organ is well designed through selection despite its appearance (MA) focused attention on a set of possible hypotheses regarding the function of the nose. The implications of MA will be further discussed in Sect. 3 and compared to the following case regarding research on network motifs in systems biology.
Case 2: Reverse Engineering Biological Networks
At the molecular level it is not always possible to directly relate particular characteristics to specific functionalities. This is for instance the case for transcriptional regulatory networks, where hundreds or thousands of interactions combine transcription factors and target genes. In systems biology, models from mathematics and engineering are sometimes used as search tools for non-random pattern detection that may throw light on the functional organization of the system.
In the following we shall examine the pioneering work of Uri Alon's system biology group on the discovery of so-called network motifs in regulatory networks.
A guiding idea for the research was that the topology of biological networks could resemble that of electronic networks where well-designed circuit elements are used as basic design principles in different contexts when a characteristic function must be obtained (Alon, personal correspondence) . To explore the structural search criteria for biological systems, a dataset on transcriptional regulatory interactions in E. coli was modelled as a directed graph representing the regulatory connections among transcription factors and genes. Using mathematical algorithms the research team scanned the biological network for recurring sub-units and compared this result to 1,000 networks where nodes were randomly linked . The result was a strikingly small set of statistically abundant patterns in the biological networks, called network motifs. Examples are pictured on Fig. 2 .
Mathematical modelling of the circuits as Boolean input functions suggested that different motifs had characteristic information-processing functions. For instance, the analysis suggested that the feedforward-loop (FFL) could act as a persistency detector for signals that activate protein synthesis. Due to the time delay of the indirect pathway, Y must pass a threshold for activation by X that causes a delay to ON but not to OFF steps (Fig. 3) . Thus, only persistent activation-stimuli would lead to transcription of the gene.
Despite the simplicity of the model used, the prediction was experimentally confirmed in a setup where fluorescent reporter plasmids were incorporated in regulatory systems in E. coli to compare the activation profile for FFLs and simple circuits (Mangan et al. 2003) . This positive result led to suggestions for generalizable selective benefits of network motifs (Alon 2007a) . For instance, in a noisy environment, FFL-regulation may help the cell save energy by filtering out short pulses of input signals that would otherwise initiate synthesis of enzymes that are not needed (Alon 2007b) .
The functional characteristics and the overabundance of the motifs suggest, in Alons view, that these have a selective basis: ''[…] edges in network motifs must be Fig. 1 Schematic view of the head of a sperm whale. B brain, BI blow hole, Mo monkey lips, T tag for recording sound, So spermaceti organ. Simplified from constantly selected in order to survive randomization forces. This suggests that if network motifs appear in a network much more often than in randomized networks, it must have been selected based on some advantage it gives to the organism'' (Alon 2007a, 29, original emphasis) . 6 This statement is connected to Alon's definition of 'conservative' and 'convergent' molecular evolution that can be summarized as follows. Two genes with similar functions, stemming from a common ancestor gene, are thought to exemplify conservative evolution. 'Convergent evolution' is defined as a sign of selection acting on independent (non-homologous) traits, like the well-known example of wings for flying in bats and birds. To back up the claim about convergent evolution of network motifs, Alon refers to the lack of homology of network motifs (Alon 2007a, b) . He argues that if FFLs resulted from duplication of ancestral FFLs, the regulators would also be homologous whereas comparisons of gene sequences show that FFLs are found in different transcription factor families in yeast and bacteria. Critics have not found the divergence in orthology mapping compelling as evidence for convergent selection of network motifs (see Sect. 3.1.2). They question the background assumption of neutral evolution as a 'random process' represented by the randomized networks used for comparison when detecting network motifs. Akin to Gould and Lewontin's criticism, the possibility has been raised that network motifs may be 'spandrels of genome evolution' and that the attempt to isolate overlapping regulatory patterns as independent functional units exemplifies a problematic atomization of traits (reviewed in Solé and Valverde 2006) . The problem of functional isolation refers to the high degree of overlapping nodes and edges in biological networks as well as to functional dependence on specific kinetic parameter values (Knabe et al. 2008; Mazurie et al. 2005) . Such examples have generated heated discussions on the pitfalls of adaptationist and engineeringinspired heuristics in biology. The following section reevaluates the use of MA in biology in light of the cases examined.
Reevaluating Methodological Adaptationism
A common strategy used to defend MA is to stress the testability of adaptive hypotheses. For instance, Resnik argues that adaptationism as a heuristic ''does not have these Panglossian implications because it merely guides biological discovery, not biological justification'' (Resnik 1997, 49) . Although MA as a heuristic is not falsifiable (since it is not a claim about the world), the specific or general hypotheses about causal relations are (Orzack and Sober 2001) . This type of argumentation has affinities with Wimsatt's (2007) more general argument that heuristics can be calibrated through triangulation of evidence. However, for Wimsatt there is no sharp separation of discovery and justification, since both are aspects of this triangulation process, and we must therefore aim for a greater awareness of the systematic biases of heuristics.
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The primacy of MA is often associated with assumptions regarding the power of natural selection (and thereby indirectly with EA), and MA has been problematized with reference to the weaknesses of EA. In response, Orzack and Sober (1994b) argue that non-adaptationist methodologies can be equally biased and that if adaptationism as a research strategy is untestable, so is pluralism. I believe this is correct. But what makes Gould and Lewontin's focus on adaptationism particularly relevant is the dominance of adaptationism in contemporary research practice. What remains unquestioned, in their view, is the idea that an adaptive explanation is the end goal of analysis. Thus, Gould and Lewontin's (1979) criticism goes beyond the issue of testability in criticizing how one falsified adaptive claim is always replaced by another adaptive candidate.
So, how can we evaluate heuristics in science? Wimsatt (2007) outlines four central properties of heuristics: fallibility, relative efficiency, the systematic character of their biases, and the sometimes hidden way in which they can transform problems into intuitively related but nonequivalent problems. The direction of errors for specific heuristics can be analyzed by identifying where answers to the transformed problems do not answer the original (biological) problem or where they negatively constrain the space of relevant aspects. Evaluating the implications of MA therefore involves a consideration of possible 'blind spots' generated by the constraints of the heuristic. Furthermore, it requires a specification of the strength of the methodological position.
Godfrey-Smith (2001) states that adaptationist positions can come in strong and moderate versions. A moderate methodological adaptationist defends the productivity of this heuristic but does not hold that this is the only one needed in biology. In contrast, a strong account views MA as the heuristic of biology. This account can be based on EA or on the success of previous projects where MA was used. For instance, Mayr (1983) argues that the methodology of adaptationism has been the basis of every advance in physiology. A strong account can also be based on an argument of methodological completeness (Dawkins 1976; Dennett 1995) . In such accounts, MA is considered the best methodology even for discovering nonselective effects because deviations from the predicted optimum in optimality modeling can be used as search tools for constraints on selection. Thus, it may be argued that MA is the only reasoning strategy biology needs even if natural selection is not the only driving force of evolution. The strong form of MA relies on three assumptions; (1) that good standards and possibilities for testing adaptive claims exist, (2) that MA does not negatively affect the motivation to consider alternatives to selective explanations, and (3) that no other heuristic is needed because all relevant aspects can result from MA. These points are related but for the purpose of clarity I shall discuss them separately in the following sections.
Testing Requirements in Different Contexts
In the context of the adaptationism debate, attention has been drawn to testing requirements for optimality modeling. The combined use of functional predictions and phylogenetic comparisons is claimed to test for both adaptation and phylogenetic inertia and therefore to provide an unbiased testing procedure (Hansen et al. 2008) . While these methods are fruitful for testing adaptive claims in contexts where construction of phylogenies is possible, it is important to note that different testing procedures are required in different research contexts. In the following I reflect on the testing requirements in the cases studies and argue that these differ in functional and evolutionary studies and for different levels of analysis.
MA in Functional Analysis
As the cases examined show, MA sometimes guides the generation of hypotheses that explain the function of traits. To make sense of MA in this context, a comparison to Lewens' (2004) definition of weak adaptive thinking and weak reverse engineering is useful. The 'weaker' reasoning forms are not historical enterprises but focus on roles of parts or processes in relation to an overall capacity of systems. Since the analysis does not aim to explain the origin of traits, design analogies in this context are heuristically more modest than the standard definition of MA. Although both cases examined in the previous section draw on MA, much of the research focuses on causal capacities of traits in extant organisms. Importantly, the criteria for testing such claims do not depend on evidence regarding ancestral populations (cf. Forber 2009).
In the first case on the spermaceti organ, the evidence that determined the fate of the competing hypotheses was provided by direct measurements of foraging clicks . Similarly, evidence against the 'big-bang' hypothesis rested on the lack of measurable effects of powerful sound pressures on prey (Wilson et al. 2008) . Thus, what settled the controversy was the demonstration of the organ's capacity (in terms of causal mechanisms). Evolutionary considerations guide and inform this analysis. For instance, different species of toothed whales have been compared to investigate the relation between the size of the sound producing organ, sonar range and maximum foraging depth (Madsen, personal communication) . Knowledge about evolutionary mechanisms can also make functional hypotheses more or less likely. Yet, the confirmation of a hypothesis regarding a function of a trait ultimately rests on a demonstration of the performance of this function that in some cases can be different than the reason for why it evolved.
Similarly, the evaluation of the information-processing function of network motifs is not dependent on evidence for selection, but on the match between the mathematical predictions and experimental results (Mangan et al. 2003) . In both cases, the function remains unquestioned even if the trait evolved neutrally. 8 The scope of generalizations regarding the function of network motifs has been questioned with reference to the lower frequency of network motifs relative to different null-models. However, network motifs may be functionally important regardless of their frequency and evolutionary origin. Alon states that overabundance compared to randomization is as a good starting point for finding functionally important patterns but he also emphasizes that the overabundant motifs are not necessarily the functionally most important ones (Alon, personal correspondence; Shen-Orr et al. 2002) . It is also worth noting that recent work inspired by his approach does not base the notion of motif on frequency (Tyson and Novák 2010). In summary, although phylogenetic comparisons may inform functional studies, the functional statements are not dependent on evidence for selection. In the following I discuss the implications of MA in practices geared towards conclusions about origin. I start by reflecting on MA at different levels of biological organization.
MA in Evolutionary Analyses
MA is often seen as particularly problematic for studies at the molecular level because the importance of neutral evolution is argued to be greater at this level (Godfrey-Smith 2001; Lynch 2007a; Kimura 1985; Koonin 2011; Pigliucci 2009 ). In contrast, assuming that morphological structures like the spermaceti organ are adaptations seems unproblematic. Nevertheless, the difference may not be as big at it appears. We do not have to look far from the example of the spermaceti organ to find a case where there is doubt. Unlike the sperm whale, some toothed whales including harbor porpoises have two sets of phonic lips. It was previously thought that the additional set is an adaptation that allows porpoises to increase the power output and bandwidths of the clicks, but recordings only demonstrate sound emission from the right pair of phonic lips (Madsen et al. 2010) . The historical basis for this character is still unknown, but it is possible that the explanation will involve non-selective (developmental) constraints.
9 Thus, reference to the status of EA on this level of analysis is not sufficient to render MA unproblematic. More importantly, and as mentioned in Sect. 1, the justification of MA and EA are dissociable since whether MA is problematic or productive may be largely independent of the status of EA. However, some differences between different levels of analysis are relevant for the discussion of the ramifications of MA, since there are different challenges associated with testing of adaptive claims at the different levels.
For morphological traits, testing of adaptationist hypotheses typically involves evaluation of functional predictions regarding relative fitness measures and phylogenetic comparisons of the extant and ancestral character state and variation in populations (Forber 2009; Hansen et al. 2008; Orzack and Sober 2001) . Despite advances in the available methodologies, there is still an ongoing debate on the specific testing requirements, e.g. how much genetic information is needed to support conclusions on historical trajectories (cf. Brandon and Rausher 1996; Pigliucci and Kaplan 2000; Pigliucci 2009 ). In the context of molecular networks, several additional questions remain open due to the abstract nature of the topological structures investigated and to the lack of knowledge about ancestral network states (Knight and Pinney 2009) . The general approach for evaluation of molecular evolution is therefore often a combination of functional predictions and comparative studies to evaluate patterns of correlation for derived and conserved characters (within genomes and between groups of extant organisms).
10 These methods were used in the case of network motifs but, as I shall clarify below, several issues complicate the debate.
First, it is often unclear whether the unit of selection refers to a FFL in a specific context or to the general type of motif (Konagurthy and Lesk 2008) . Beneficial functions are often discussed as a matter of global optima (properties of network motifs in general) while evidence is established only for local optima (Mangan et al. 2003) . Furthermore, the function and origin of network motifs are evaluated from different types of data sets. Proponents of the adaptive claim refer to experimental 9 The example is analogous to Coddington's ''Two-Horn Rhinoceros Problem'' (Sober 1993, 123) . Even if horns in rhinos (or phonic lips in porpoises) are clear examples of adaptations, it does not follow that selection explains why some species have two instances of the trait. Similarly, the selective advantage of some network motifs does not show that the general overabundance is due to the same evolutionary mechanism. 10 For well-understood and simple molecular traits developing over short evolutionary time scales direct experimentation may be possible. When evolutionary experiments in vivo or in silico are possible, testing of adaptive hypotheses can be easier than for the macrolevel. This problematizes any strong distinction between the ramifications of MA with respect to organizational levels. demonstration of functional significance of individual motifs in bacterial systems and anticipate a similarity in other organisms (Alon 2003 (Alon , 2007a , whereas critics argue for the opposite based on computer simulations of the regulatory dynamic of more complex yeast networks (Mazurie et al. 2005; Ward and Thorton 2007) .
Similarly, disagreements about the degree of homology of network motifs are partly related to the different approaches used to evaluate common ancestry. One type of analysis shows no common ancestry among circuit types and considers gene duplication a rare event (Babu et al. 2004; Conant and Wagner 2003) , whereas others argue for the opposite (Cordero and Hogeweg 2006; Knabe et al. 2008 ). However, the former type of analysis regards whole-motif duplication and target-gene duplication, whereas the latter focuses on the evolution of regulators (establishment of new binding cites between transcription factors and promoters). Some evaluate homology of genes in different species (Babu et al. 2004 ) whereas others focus on divergence and conservation within the same genome (Conant and Wagner 2003; Cordero and Hogeweg 2006) . Furthermore, critics of the adaptationist view have complained that the origin of network motifs is often discussed without reference to species-specific differences, neglecting how evolution via duplication and divergence might have differed in prokaryotes and eukaryotes (Kuo et al. 2006) . Accordingly, the results are difficult to compare as evidence for or against general evolutionary features of network motifs. The point I flag is not that this issue cannot be settled or that no criteria for evaluating these accounts exits. Rather, I use the examples to show that an evaluation of MA must go beyond the issue of falsifiability 'in principle' and take such disagreements in practice into consideration.
Methodologies and Scientific Worldviews
Could MA affect the motivation for considering alternative explanations and thereby the way the subject matter is perceived? Gould and Lewontin's works raise a deeper philosophical question about whether it is possible to consider the production and evaluation of hypotheses as independent epistemic activities. The famous controversy between Dawkins and Gould reflects the difference between a falsificationist perspective, relying on requirements for testing, and Gould's view that believes that scientific knowledge is sensitive to cultural and ideological influences (for details, see Sterely 2007) . Several of Gould's writings criticize research where (racist) ideological contexts have distorted the view of phenotypic differences among humans (e.g. Gould 1996) . Similarly, the widespread and surprisingly persistent metaphor of the 'genetic program' has nurtured a deterministic and reductionist view on the relation between genes and phenotypes. The point is not that we have no means for testing whether the genome is like a software code but that uncritical use of such 'organizing concepts' can influence how a subject matter is perceived.
Gould and Lewontin (1979) criticize evolutionary biologists for their lack of interest in non-selective constraints. They foresee a possible counterargument that afterwards has been rehearsed several times in the debate, namely that their criticism overlooks the fact that any adaptationist analysis involves considerations of drift and phylogenetic inertia. While admitting that this is correct, they see a problem in the low impact such considerations have on evolutionary explanations in practice. The problem is that non-selective forces are not given much explanatory weight compared to selection. This point is central to the long-lasting debate between adaptationists and non-adaptationists on the different views on constraints. Non-adaptationists would not be satisfied with the inclusion of constraints as a limit to the variation that the ''real'' driving force of evolution, i.e. selection, can act on. They stress the need to accept the constructive aspects of neutral evolution and for constraints to enter the stage of intelligible explanations (Amundson 1994) .
This point is echoed in the debates on adaptationism in systems biology where methodological concerns regard the extent to which assumptions about the characteristics of neutral evolution influence the conclusions of analysis. If it is assumed that changes in the in-degree profile of networks can only result from selection, it becomes highly unlikely that other forces could explain the existence of network motifs (cf. Dekel et al. 2005; Hogeweg 2012) . If neutral evolution is reduced to a randomization process, there is no point in looking for nonselective ordering principles. In a recent review of molecular design principles it is even explicitly stated that it is assumed that effects of drift and population size can be neglected as factors that have shaped their origin (Salvado et al. 2011) . Proponents of the new stream called evolutionary systems biology consider this approach problematic because from the outset the possibility that design principles could have a non-selective origin is ignored (Steinacher and Soyer 2012) . Admittedly, the criticism is not targeted at the most advanced uses of MA where such assumptions are treated with caution. It does however regard influential contemporary research. Moreover, even if the two assumptions of strong MA remain unquestioned, it is still an issue of debate whether MA is the only heuristic needed. This issue will be examined in the following section.
The Relative Efficiency of MA
A strong version of MA would argue that adaptationist methodology is the heuristic of biology, even for discovering effects of neutral evolution. This section discusses the claim in relation to a recent example from evolutionary systems biology. My aim is not to dispute the claim that MA can be productive for discovering nonselective factors through identification of deviations from the expected optimum. The example mentioned on the discovery of a non-functional set of phonic lips in porpoises may turn out to be one such example. This productive role however requires that alternatives to selection are considered as serious options. Moreover, it does not follow from such examples that MA is the best strategy for uncovering all aspects of evolution.
MA focuses attention on features of apparent design solutions and is a productive heuristic for identifying candidates for connections between causal capacities and selective pressures. But MA appears less suited for investigating the general basis of genetic variation, structural constraints on morphology, or nonrandom effects of drift, since the research topic in these analyses is outside the scope of features of good design (Kimura 1985; Lynch 2007a, b; Müller and Newman 2003) . To illustrate this point I shall elaborate a little further on the case on network motifs. As we have seen, most of the research on network motifs has focused on evidence for and against adaptive origin of these patterns. A key insight in this debate however resulted from a modeling approach that did not focus on any pre-defined patterns in the first place. Cordero and Hogeweg (2006) developed a framework for studying the effects of mutational dynamics in non-supervised, or non-goal-directed, evolutionary simulations of regulatory networks. In this model, promoter regions are changed according to experimentally measured rates of mutational dynamics (deletion, mutation, duplication and recombination) in transcriptional regulatory networks of yeast. Although the model allows for a high degree of freedom, surprisingly well-organized patterns appeared after 2000 generations (Fig. 4a-c) . At this point a hierarchical structure with a scale-free distribution was observed.
Note that on the figure many of the network motifs (marked with white nodes) consist of highly overlapping network structures. At a certain point in the simulation, an avalanche of network motifs appears when a connection is added between two hub nodes (upper edge in Fig. 4c ). At first, the appearance of network motifs was thought to be an artifact of the model (Hogeweg, personal correspondence) but further investigations revealed that this tight overlap fits with data on network motifs in yeast networks (Cordero and Hogeweg 2006) . The result shows that random mutational operations can have non-random effects and suggests that neutral forces are important in the evolution of network motifs. Since the methodology is not focused on explaining the selective origin of pre-defined patterns, it is not part of adaptationist research methodology. 11 The same holds for the use of mathematical tools to search for (non-selective) ''laws of evolution'' in comparative studies of prokaryote and eukaryote genomes (Koonin 2011) . Nevertheless, the results are directly relevant for adaptationist analysis.
While systems biology needs to integrate methods from evolutionary biology to overcome the pitfalls of adaptationism (Lynch 2007b) , evolutionary systems biologists stress that evolutionary biology ultimately needs systems biology to deal with a number of current challenges (reviewed in O'Malley 2012). In particular, the current methodologies for testing of adaptive hypotheses face limitations when the aim is to answer questions about characteristics of biological networks such as robustness, modularity, and evolvability, and novel methods such as advanced simulations are needed to clarify these aspects (Steinacher and Soyer 2012) . This challenge has a more general scope; for global traits it is often difficult to express adaptive utility precisely enough to test the issue via a contest between models (Godfrey-Smith 2001).
The difficulty of drawing conclusions across specific and general contexts is further complicated by the fact that the explanatory status of natural selection may vary with the epistemic level of the evolutionary analysis. Wilkins and GodfreySmith (2009) demonstrate how different views on the role of natural selection may result if different choices are made about the level of detail to describe adaptive landscapes. They argue that it makes a difference whether the aim is to analyze genetic variability on the molecular level, to explain evolution of local traits on an intermediate level, or to investigate the difference between the possible and realized morphospace on the highest level. Importantly, adaptationist explanations at the intermediate level are compatible with nonselective explanations at the higher level. While selection might explain why a particular trait has evolved as a result of adaptive specialization to specific environments, other factors are needed to clarify why the lineage is situated in a specific region of the landscape of possible phenotypes. The limitations of MA to explain why the population exists in a specific region of the larger landscape do not counteract the productivity of the heuristic to explain local optima. But the reverse also holds; just because MA is productive for some types of analysis, it does not follow that it should be the general organizing concept of biological research. To explore what factors affect the shaping of phenotypic patterning in relation to the larger morphospace, researchers have often expressed their preference for alternative heuristics (Goodwin 1994; Müller and Newman 2003) . The problem with strong MA, and arguably also with some accounts critical of MA, is the imperialistic tendencies that do not leave room for pluralism.
Conclusion
In response to Gould and Lewontin's (1979) criticism it has been argued that testing of adaptive hypotheses saves MA from Panglossian implications and that good testing procedures may even make MA particularly productive for discovering non-selective features. In response to this position I have emphasized that Gould and Lewontin's criticism goes beyond the issue of testability. The question they raise is whether methodological habits have led to a simplified view of the goal of biological research and the subject of study. In particular, they object to the general idea that the biologist's job is not done until an adaptive explanation is found. This paper argues in favor of the productivity of MA but takes issue with the strong account that argues that MA is the heuristic of biology. In discussing cases from physiology and systems biology I have highlighted the different implications of MA for functional and evolutionary analysis. The argument does not presuppose that functional and evolutionary analysis always can be meaningfully separated. However, since the hypotheses regarding functional design do not depend on evidence for ancestral states, it is important to discuss the implications of MA in functional and evolutionary studies separately. With regard to evolutionary studies I have emphasized the ongoing controversy over testing requirements and exemplified this with the different types of evidence put forward in support of conflicting views on the evolution of network motifs. Analyses of the origin of global structures, like topological features of regulatory networks, present particularly difficult cases with respect to evaluation of the hypotheses because conclusions are drawn across specific and general contexts and because the explanatory status of natural selection varies with the level of analysis (Wilkins and Godfrey-Smith 2009) . While natural selection may explain the shaping of a particular trait, such as a particular network motif, it may not explain why the networks are situated within a realized morphospace where these structures are overabundant in many different systems. Explaining the latter may require other heuristic strategies, as exemplified by simulation studies on the effects of random mutational operations over evolutionary time-scales.
In summary, MA is an indispensable and productive research tool for many research projects in biology but should not be considered the only game in town. Complementary organizing concepts and methodologies are sometimes needed to address other evolutionary questions, e.g. regarding long-term structural effects of mutational dynamics and non-selective constraints. Since adaptationist and antiadaptationist research fields have largely developed in parallel, Gould and Lewontin's criticism is still a relevant reminder of how methodological imperialism can impede the development and integration of other relevant research strategies and perspectives. Perhaps because of the provocative tone in the Spandrels-paper, it is often forgotten that the paper was not just a criticism of adaptationism but a call for a methodological and explanatory pluralism. I hope this paper can serve as a reminder of the depth of the criticism and the importance of the latter point.
